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ARTICLES
Blogging: A Journal Need Not a
Journalist Make
Anne Flanagan*
INTRODUCTION
This article explores the status of “blogs” and “bloggers” as
journalists in the context of journalistic privilege and other
exceptions to legal obligations under U.S. and U.K. laws designed
to accommodate freedom of expression. Before that, however, it
looks briefly at this fairly recent phenomenon that has emerged in
the still somewhat freewheeling culture of the Internet. This
discussion is intended to show that the great number, variety and
often participatory, unedited and sometimes ill-considered content
of blogs challenges traditional notions of journalism. Despite its
foibles, this new medium of expression has growing import and
possible significance for the future of how news and ideas are
disseminated. As this may blur the lines between traditional
journalists and bloggers, this article considers what meaningful
criteria can be used to ensure that the legal protections accorded to
journalists so that the public can receive news and ideas are
properly inclusive of blogs and bloggers. It concludes that the
customary adherence to a meaningful professional standard or code
of conduct can demonstrate the use of a journalistic process to
*
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gather, verify and publish information, one criteria that has been
suggested as the dividing line.
I. BLOGS AND BLOGGERS
Blogging is the act of writing or maintaining a “blog.”1 A web
log or simply a blog, a portmanteau of ‘web’ and ‘log,’ is a website
containing, at a minimum, posted entries often around a particular
area of interest and that are typically time-stamped by blogging
software.2 These posts are often, but not necessarily, in reverse
chronological order, so that one would have to trace the thread of
that topic back to the first posting. Such a website would usually
be accessible to any Internet user.3 As noted, there are blogs of
many kinds and addressing many topics. One blog directory lists
‘politics,’ ‘music,’ ‘life,’ ‘art,’ ‘culture,’ ‘news,’ ‘technology,’
‘personal,’ ‘humor,’ ‘photography,’ ‘love,’ ‘sex,’ ‘movies’ and
‘writing’ among the keywords that categorize its posted blog
links.4 There are even blogs on blogs,5 which might be called
‘metablogs’ in techie parlance.
The growth of blog numbers is unquestionable. One American
research project has categorized blogs as a “key part of online
culture,” noting that in 2004, some eight million Americans had
created blogs.6 While the same report notes, however, that 62% of
Americans were completely unfamiliar with blogs, a 58% increase
in blog readership in the U.S. since 2004, indicates that more and
more Americans are becoming familiar with this technology.7 Nor
1
However, a blog without original content that merely maintains links to others is
referred to as a ‘splog’, a combination of ‘spam’ and ‘blog’. Wikipedia, ‘List of blogging
terms’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_blogging_terms (last visited February 1,
2006).
2
Wikipedia, ‘Weblog’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weblog (emphasis in original)
(last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
3
Id.
4
See Blogwise, ‘Blogs by Keyword’, http://www.blogwise.com (last visited February
1, 2006).
5
Id.
6
Data Memo from PIP Director Lee Rainie, Pew Internet & American Life Project,
The State of Blogging (Jan. 2, 2005), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/
pdfs/PIP_blogging_data.pdf.
7
Id.
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are blogs merely a domestic trend. There are estimated to be over
13 million blogs in China.8 Indeed, their entrenchment in the
Internet culture is further marked by the fact a blogger’s lexicon
has developed.9
Blogs are a potentially unlimited publication format. They are
often characterized by casualness and unedited dialog akin to
chatting with those familiar to you.10 It is not surprising, therefore,
that some bloggers have run afoul of legal rules and corporate
cultures. For example, one online report ascribes the firings of
several employees of United States companies to the content of
their blogs.11 Purportedly, one was fired after publishing a
“suggestive” photo of herself in her Delta Airline attendant’s
uniform;12 another after gossiping about the behavior at her
company’s Christmas party.13 Even cutting-edge companies seem
no more progressive in their attitudes to the unedited nature of
these new fora. Reportedly, Google terminated an employee for
ruminating online about its finances14 and a Microsoft employee
lost his job after publishing on his website a photo of Apple
computers on a Microsoft loading dock, seemingly a security
violation.15 These and other reports16 make clear only that some
companies have little sense of humor when it comes to blog
postings and their corporate image. The risk to some bloggers
does not seem to have seriously deterred their use by others,
however.

8

See Howard W. French, Letter from China: Despite Web Crackdown, Prevailing
Winds Are Free, NY Times, Feb. 9, 2006 at A4.
9
Wikipedia,
‘List
of
blogging
terms’,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_blogging_terms (last visited February 1, 2006).
10
See Steve Outing, The 11 Layers of Citizen Journalism, POYNTERONLINE, June 15,
2005, http://www.poynter.org/content/content_view.asp?id=83126 (noting that “[w]hat
people write goes on [the unedited news blogs]: blemishes, misspellings and all”).
11
See Anick Jesdanun, Blog-Related Firings Focus on Policy, WASH. POST, Mar. 6,
2005, at B12.
12
Id.
13
See id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
See, e.g., Jeremy Blachman, Job Posting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2005, at A19,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/31/opinion/31blachman.html?th&emc=th.
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Many blogs are still perceived as, and are in fact, mere
personal diaries or observations, or, indeed, even ideological rants.
Others, however, have edged notably toward the boundaries of
traditional media or served its function as sources of information.
For example, blogs have provided valuable checks on mainstream
press,17 comprised alternatives to government-restricted media
outlets18 or have gained mainstream institutional recognition.19
Illustrative here are the issuance of White House press credentials
to a blogger,20 the recent citation by the United States Supreme
Court to a law blog (or ‘blawg’)21 and the numerous notations of
the growing role of ‘citizen journalists’ as news sources (such as
the posting of photos and news reports by soldiers fighting in
Iraq).22 In fact, traditional media outlets now have their own blogs.
This institutional lowering of barriers to this medium may be a
natural consequence of its growth and use by many. This is
despite the cultural rejection by those who consider their very
distinction from the mainstream to be the hallmark of a blogger.
The drift by numerous blogs toward traditional media has led to
efforts to define blogging’s standards, including ethical and other

17
Wikipedia, ‘Weblog’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weblog (last visited Apr. 29,
2005) (noting that within 72 hours of the 60 Minutes II report that caused Dan Rather to
resign from CBS News, conservative bloggers had built a case that documents shown
during the report were likely forgeries).
18
See Howard W. French, Letter from China: Despite Web Crackdown, Prevailing
Winds Are Free, NY Times, Feb. 9, 2006 at A4.
19
Id.
20
See Katherine Seelye, White House Approves Press Pass for Blogger, NY TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2005, at C5 (noting the credentialing of FishbowlDC published by
Mediabistro.com).
21
See United States. v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 775 n.4 (2005) (Stevens, J. dissent)
(citing unpublished memoradum by Christopher A Wray, Assistant Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice, Guidance Regarding The Application Of Blakely v.
Washington, 2004 WL 1402697 (June 24, 2004) To All Pending Cases, available at
Sentencing Law and Policy: A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/files/chris_wray_doj_memo.p
df).
22
See, e.g., S. Outing, The 11 Layers of the Citizen Journalist, Poynter Online, June 15,
2005, available at http://www.poynter.org/content/content_view.asp?id=83126; S. Rubel,
Citizen Journalist Chronicles SF Explosion, Micro Persuasion, Aug. 19, 2005, available
at http://www.micropersuasion.com/2005/08/citizen_journal.html. See also Wikipedia,
‘Weblog’, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weblog (last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
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boundaries as this Internet medium of expression evolves and
matures.23
II. THE BLOGGER AS JOURNALIST?
One evolutionary boundary poses a potentially difficult
question: is a blogger a journalist under the law? This is not a
theoretical issue. It is one that has recently been considered in
several contexts in the United States and that could present a
quandary for Congress in the near future. The first of these was
the consideration by the Federal Election Commission in its rulemaking process of whether blogs are entitled to the “media
exemption” from corporate spending limits under the federal
campaign finance laws.24 The issue similarly arose with assertion
of the journalistic privilege by several blog authors in opposition to
a subpoena by Apple Corporation in California to compel an
Internet service provider (ISP) to disclose the sources of leaked
information regarding unreleased Apple products.25 This is a
scenario that may test traditional “freedom of the press” rights26
and the scope of journalist privileges under the First Amendment.
It would also test state-based “shield” laws, which were enacted in
response to a perceived lack of protection for journalist
information sources under the Constitution.27 The underlying
question of the qualification of a journalist under the law in this era

23

See, e.g., Blogger’s Code of Ethics, Cyberjournalist.net, available at
http://www.pcij.org/blog/?page_id=3 (noting that it is based on the Society of
Professional Journalists Code of Ethics) (last visited Aug. 30, 2005). The code, however,
does not reference the use of confidential sources or the ethical obligation to keep any
promise made to confidential sources. See id.
24
See infra Part II A.
25
See infra Part II. B.
26
See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Defending the First in the Ninth: Judge Alex
Kozinski and the Freedoms of Speech and Press, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 257, 273
(2004). In considering issues surrounding the scope of press freedoms raised by one
technology, the Internet, it is interesting to note the historical fact that the expression
‘freedom of the press’ arises from another technology, the printing press which involved
the ‘pressing’ ink on paper via a manual process and which is suggested to have taken its
name from yet another technology, a wine ‘press’ which it resembled. This technology
has long been obsolete despite the residual use of the word.
27
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1410 (8th ed. 2004).
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of ubiquitous online publication also has context under the United
Kingdom laws that accord special privileges to protect freedom of
expression.28 The following first explores the issues under the
Federal Election laws and the journalistic privileges under the First
Amendment and state “shield” laws. It then addresses how the
question of whether bloggers are journalists might be answered. It
does this in the context of the journalistic exception from
numerous obligations placed on controllers of personal data under
the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act 199829 and the
qualified privilege against defamation.30
A. The Election Law Media Exemption and Bloggers
The consideration by the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
in its rule-making process of whether blogs are entitled to the
“media exemption” from corporate spending limits under the
federal campaign finance laws arises from Shays v. FEC.31 In this
case, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
ordered the FEC to revise its rules issued in implementing the
McCain-Feingold campaign finance reforms.32 The Shays court
held, among other things, that the term “public communication”
should include some communications over the Internet which the
FEC rules had impermissibly fully exempted.33 Federal campaign
finance laws define “public communication” to be “a
communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite
communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility,
mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other
form of general public political advertising.”34 Even though
“Internet communications” is not specifically listed, the court

28
See generally Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29, § 1 (Eng.) (regulating the processing
of information relating to individuals, including the obtaining, holding, use or disclosure
of such information).
29
Data Protection Act, 1998, ch. 29 (Eng.).
30
See infra Part IV B.
31
337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, No. 04–5352, 2005 WL 1653053 (D.C. Cir.
July 15, 2005).
32
Id. at 65, 67–71
33
Id.
34
Id. at 65.
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found that some Internet communications clearly fall within the
category of “general public political advertising.”35
This definition of “public communication” is important. It
triggers certain funding limits and funding-source disclosure
obligations called ‘disclaimers.’ Political parties and committees
are restricted to the expenditure of delimited federal campaign
funds on public communications that promote, attack, support or
oppose (PASOs) any candidate for federal office.36 The laws also
limit contributions that corporations and labor unions can spend on
certain activities in connection with federal elections, including
PASOs, unless done through separately financed political action
committees (“PACs”).37 PACs are also regulated by reporting and
other requirements.38
Following Shays, various Internet
communications will as well be subject to the funding limitations
under revised rules that must be issued by the FEC.
The corporate funding limitations for public communications
do not, however, apply to media corporations39 such as Fox, the
New York Times or the Washington Post. This is pursuant to a
“media exemption” provided for under the laws regarding
“contributions” which states that
[a]ny cost incurred in covering or carrying a news story,
commentary, or editorial by any broadcasting station
(including a cable television operator, programmer or
producer), newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication is not a contribution unless the facility is owned
or controlled by any political party, political committee, or
candidate . . . .40
This means that media corporations can endorse or support a
candidate as and to the extent they choose.41

35

Id. at 67–69.
See 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2002); 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.24(b)(3), 300.13(a),
300.32(a)(1)–(2); 300.36(a)(1) (2005).
37
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 118 (2003).
38
2 U.S.C. § 434 (2000 & Supp. 2002).
39
11 C.F.R. § 100.73 (2005).
40
Id.
41
See id.
36
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In attempting to comply with Shays, the FEC has proposed that
only paid political Internet advertisements placed on another’s
website be categorized as a communication that can trigger “the
contribution regulation.”42 If this proposal is followed, most
Internet communications would continue to be excluded from the
definition of “public communications” for purposes of the
contribution limits.43 In addition, the proposed rules would not
implement a payment disclaimer requirement for bloggers, which
would otherwise require bloggers to disclose the source that paid
for their comments including political party or committee
sources.44 However, the FEC does question (1) whether a blogger
should be required to disclose payments if they expressly
advocated “the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate;”
and (2) whether “payment by a political committee to a blogger for
promotional content on [a] blog constitute(s) ‘general political
advertising.’”45
The FEC’s proposal would extend the “media exemption” to
encompass Internet media by clarifying that the list of media
includes “other periodical publications” whether they appear in
print or on the Internet.46 This extension hardly seems necessary
given the extent of the continuing carve-outs for Internet
communications. The extended media list would encompass
institutional media websites, even those with no offline presence.
The FEC sought comments as to whether bloggers could fall
within periodical publications and whether a blogger’s activity
should be considered commentary or editorializing or news story
activity.47 There is a concern that bloggers’ participation in the
political process will be unduly restrained by unnecessary
regulation.48 However, there is also a concern that unlimited
42
Internet Communic’ns, 70 Fed. Reg. 16,967, 16,970–71 (Apr. 4, 2005) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110 and 114).
43
See generally id.
44
Id. at 16972–73.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 16974–75.
47
Id. at 16975.
48
See Letter of Deirdre K. Mulligan, Director, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public
Policy Clinic, School of Law, University of California at Berkeley, Geoffrey Cowan,
Dean, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Southern California, and
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carve-outs for blogs could erode the constraints intended by the
recently-reformed campaign finance laws by permitting
corporations and unions to give candidates unlimited contributions
via the use of blogs.49 Final rules have yet to be promulgated.
With its petition for a hearing by the full D.C. Circuit50 now
denied, the FEC indicates that it now intends to proceed
aggressively with the rule making. It expects the final rules to be
promulgated by the end of February 2006.51 Thus, the limitations,
if any, imposed on blogs qualifying as “media” under the federal
election laws remain to be seen. Such limitations, however, are
unlikely to be stringent, given the FEC’s expressed concern that
“commentary,” within the defined functions of exempt “media,” is
intended to include third-party access to media outlets.52
B. Bloggers and Journalistic Privilege
The second development raising the issue of the legal status of
bloggers as journalists emerges in the very complex, fractured and
confusing world of United States law governing journalistic
privilege. Yet, its importance has been noted as threatening to the
very existence of the privilege. This is because if anyone can create
a blog and claim that his postings, no matter what their import,
purpose, or content, amount to journalism, can any assert a
privilege over others?53 A little background might prove helpful to
Matthew Grossmann, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of
California at Berkeley, to Brad C, Deutsch, Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election
Commission (June 1, 2005) (enclosing Report of the Bipartisan California Commission
on
Internet
Political
Practices),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/
nprm/internet_comm/comm_14.pdf. See also Allison R. Hayward, “System Failure,”
National Review Online, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment Hayward2005
11040830.asp.
49
See Amy Pike, Internet Hearing, 31(8) RECORD: FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 2
(Aug. 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/record/2005/Aug05.pdf#page=2.
50
See Petition for Rehearing En Banc by the Federal Election Commission, Shays v.
FEC,
No.
04-5253
(D.C.
Cir.
Aug.
29,
2005),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation/shays_v_fec_petition_rehearing_en_banc_04_5352.pdf
51
See FEC Court Case Abstracts, Shays v. FEC, Petition for Rehearing En Banc
Denied, available at http://www.fec.gov/law/litigation_CCA_S.shtml#shays_02.
52
See Internet Communic’ns, 70 Fed. Reg. 16967, 16974-75 (Apr. 4, 2005) (to be
codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110 and 114).
53
See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to
Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUSTON L.
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understand the California shield laws and to show why the status
of bloggers as journalists will not easily be definitively resolved.
Many legal scholars contend that the Supreme Court, in
Branzburg v. Hayes,54 recognized the existence of a limited
privilege under the First Amendment allowing the press to refuse
to disclose confidential source information, though such a privilege
was not expressed in the terms of the First Amendment.55 This
contested view56 points to a majority mustered from the four
dissenting and one concurring justices that a qualified privilege
exists.57
However, the decision itself concluded that journalist witnesses
to a crime were not privileged from testifying before a grand jury
despite any confidentiality agreement into which they might have
entered.58 Thus, the scope and application of journalistic privilege
can vary according to its source. Where sought pursuant to the
qualified privilege of the First Amendment, courts usually
determine its application on a case-by-case basis balancing “vital
societal and constitutional interests.”59 The scope of the privilege
can vary due to the application of different balancing tests by
different courts. The tests, however, usually at least require a
showing that (1) the information is material and relevant to the
claim; (2) the information is necessary to the maintenance of the
claim; and (3) other potential sources for the information have

REV. 1371, 1406–16 (2002–2003) (urging that the methods in which professional
journalists gather, verify and disseminate information should be the test of the
qualification of a ‘journalist’ rather than any institutional or content analysis).
54
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
55
See, e.g., Brief for the Reporters Committee for the Freedom of Press, et. al as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, O’Grady v. Superior Ct. of the State of Cal., County of
Santa Clara, at 8 (Apr. 7, 2005) (No. H028579), available at
http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Apple_v_Does/20050407_apple_brief.pdf
[hereinafter
Amici Curiae Brief].
56
See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access and the First Amendment, 44
STAN. L. REV. 927, 929 (1992) (contending that this privilege has instead been afforded to
parties by the lower courts despite the Supreme Court’s reluctance to do so in its decision
in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
57
See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 55, at 8.
58
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691 (noting expressly that the issue of confidential sources
was not before it).
59
Id. at 710 (Powell J. concurring).
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been exhausted.60 Some tests also consider whether the person is a
journalist and a party to the action61 and/or the nature of public
interest protected in publishing the information.62 The
jurisdictional variation in the scope of the privilege is significant.
Not only do the courts of the eleven federal circuits and a majority
of state courts decide the nature and scope of the privilege in
accordance with the First Amendment63 but also under individual
state constitutions64 or the common law65 where applicable.
Complexity is further compounded by the fact that thirty-one states
have enacted “shield” laws protecting journalists, inter alia, from
liability for civil and criminal contempt.66 These laws give varying
levels of protection.67 California, for example, has recognized a
First Amendment qualified privilege68 and a statutory protection
for journalists, that is now also enshrined in its state constitution.69
The variation in protection under case law and state statutes across
jurisdictions ranges from mere protection against the disclosure of
confidential sources to the protection of all unpublished
materials—whether or not confidential.70 There is no federal
statutory privilege of non-disclosure71 to enhance the limitations of
the constitutional protection.72 A federal statutory privilege has
been urged in light of the jailing of a journalist from the New York
Times in October 2004 in a politically charged case for her refusal
60

James C. Goodale, et al., Reporter’s Privilege, 580 PRAC. L. INST., PAT., COPYRIGHT,
TRADEMARK, & LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 27, 58 (1999).
61
Id. at 70, 72.
62
See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
63
State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502 (N.H. 1982).
64
Id. at 503.
65
Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 641 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Wash. 1981).
66
Berger, supra note 53, at 1392.
67
But not necessarily more full protection. See O’Neill v. Oakgrove Constr. Inc., 71
N.Y.2d 521 (1988) (decision under New York State and U.S. Federal Constitutions for
recognition of qualified privilege in journalist’s photographs that did not fall within
absolute privilege of confidential sources and information under New York’s shield law,
N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 79–h (Supp. 2006).)
68
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 629–30 (Cal. 1984).
69
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(b).
70
Goodale, et al., supra note 60, at 46–47.
71
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2000). There is a federal statutory protection from the
search and seizure of certain ‘work product’ and ‘documentary materials’ unless a listed
exemption applies. This statute applies to persons.
72
See Berger, supra note 53, at 1384–86 nn. 57–70, and accompanying text.
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to reveal a source of information about which she never wrote an
article.73 The effort behind a federal statutory provision for
protection of journalists is not likely to succeed under the current
administration and Congress. However, identical bills have been
introduced in the House and Senate74 and have been endorsed by
parties with clout, including the American Bar Association. These
bills, however, apply to a “covered person” defined as:
A) an entity that disseminates information by print,
broadcast, cable, satellite, mechanical, photographic,
electronic, or other means and that—
(i) publishes a newspaper, book, magazine, or other
periodical;
(ii) operates a radio or television broadcast station (or
network of such stations), cable system, or satellite
carrier, or a channel or programming service for any
such station, network, system, or carrier; or
(iii) operates a news agency or wire service;
B) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of such an entity; or
C) an employee, contractor, or other person who gathers,
edits, photographs, records, prepares, or disseminates news
or information for such an entity.75
The definition’s limitation to an “entity” and its parents,
affiliates and employees and those working on its behalf precludes
the extension of protection to blogs operated by individuals in
accordance with general legal meaning of “entity.”76 The Senate
bill’s co-sponsor, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has indicated
that while the debate is not yet closed, bloggers would “‘probably
not’” be considered “‘real journalists’”.77 He queried “‘how do you
73

Terry Frieden, New York Times Reporter Held in Contempt, CNN.COM, Oct. 7, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/07/miller.contempt.
74
See H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 340, 109th Cong. (2005).
75
H.R. 581, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 340, 109th Cong. (2005).
76
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (8th ed. 2004).
77
M. Fitzgerald, Shield Law Sponsor Lugar: Bloggers ‘Probably Not’ Considered
Journos,
Editor
&
Publisher,
October
10,
2005,
available
at
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determine who will be included in this bill?’”78 The Senator’s
question might be answered if the Congress were to apply a
journalistic process analysis or journalist function analysis. This is
a test that has been urged by some to determine appropriate
limitations to be imposed, including in the Apple case79 discussed
below. It is, however, suggested that the practical application of
such test should be based on the adherence to a professional code
or standard that governs the gathering, verifying and dissemination
of information. These are, as noted, the necessary elements of the
journalistic process performed by those considering themselves to
be journalists.
Those customarily adhering to professional
standards that address all of the processes would earn the right to
claim journalistic privilege. Such code or standard need not be that
of a particular professional organization. Rather, it might be that
developed by the individual blogger or news organization80 as long
as it had meaningful criteria for each aspect of the journalistic
process. How this might work is later explored in the context of
UK law.
1. The Apple Lawsuit
Three online websites devoted to Apple Computer Corporation
and its products, published several articles in late 2004 about
products that Apple had not yet released.81 The articles included
drawings and technical specifications apparently taken from a
confidential Apple presentation.82 Apple filed suit in December,
2004, against twenty-five unnamed parties (Does 1–25) alleging
that the defendants had leaked trade secret information to three

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1500073/posts (reporting the Senator’s
remarks to the Inter American Press Association).
78
Id.
79
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1, No. 1–04–CV–032178, 2005 WL 578641, *4 (Cal.
Sup. Ct., Santa Clara County Mar. 11, 2005).
80
See, e.g., the “Ethical Journalism Guidelines” of the New York Times, available at
http://www.nytco.com/company-properties-times-coe.html.
81
Id. at *1.
82
Id. at *4.
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websites.83 Reportedly, Apple believed the Does were Apple
employees.84 Apple issued a subpoena to an ISP which provided
email services to PowerPage, one of the websites, seeking
disclosure of the contents and communications data for emails and
postings to the website.85 The contents and communications data
contains information about the identity of the source(s) that
revealed the trade secret information.86 The website owners, yet
non-parties to the Apple suit, moved for a protective order,
asserting, inter alia, that this was confidential source information
protected pursuant to the journalist privilege under the First
Amendment and California’s shield laws.87 California’s shield
laws are limited to non-parties to a suit, and could therefore
theoretically apply.88 Apple, however, countered that as blogs,
these websites were not entitled to assert the privilege in any
event.89
The California shield laws are incorporated into the California
Constitution and section 1070 of its Evidence Code. The wording
of each provision is essentially identical.
The California
constitutional provision, in relevant part, states:
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person
who has been so connected or employed, shall not be adjudged in
contempt by a judicial, legislative, or administrative body, or any
other body having the power to issue subpoenas, for refusing to
disclose the source of any information procured while so
83
Dawn Kawamoto, Tentative Ruling Favors Apple in Blog Case, CNET NEWS.COM,
Mar. 4, 2005, http://news.com.com/2163ative+ruling+favors+Apple+in+blog+case/21001047_3-5599671.html.
84
Brad Gibson, TMO Exclusive—Apple Subpoenas Mac Rumor Sites Over Audio
Product, THE MAC OBSERVER, Dec. 20, 2004, http://www.macobserver.com/
article/2004/12/20.7.shtml.
85
Apple, 2005 WL 578641, at *1.
86
Id. at *2–4.
87
Id. at *4–5.
88
Id. at *6.
89
Brief for Apple Computer, Inc. in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Mandate and
/or Prohibition, at 32-33, O’Grady v. Sup. Ct. of the State of Cal., County of Santa Clara
(Apr. 7, 2005) (Civil No. H028579), available at http://www.eff.org/Censorship/
Apple_v_Does/20050407_apple_opposition.pdf.
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connected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine
or other periodical publication, or for refusing to disclose any
unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering,
receiving or processing of information for communication to the
public.
Nor shall a radio or television news reporter or other person
connected with or employed by a radio or television station, or any
person who has been so connected or employed, be so adjudged in
contempt for refusing to disclose the source of any information
procured while so connected or employed for news or news
commentary purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to
disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in
gathering, receiving or processing of information for
communication to the public. . . .90
Although the Apple court noted the possible “blog” status in
dicta,91 this was not the basis for its decision in Apple’s favor.
Rather, the superior court assumed arguendo that the movants
were journalists and ruled that the privilege did not apply to
anyone who violated the California trade secret laws.92 The court
stated that “[t]he California Legislature has not carved out any
exception to these statutes for journalists, bloggers or anyone
else.”93 However, the court then balanced the “undisputed right to
protect intellectual property” embodied in California’s
implementation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act94 (the “UTSA”)

90

CAL. CONST., art. I, § 2(b).
See Apple, 2005 WL 578641 at *2 n.4.
92
Id. at *4–5.
93
Id. at *4.
94
Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3426 et. seq (West 1997). It is possible that were the journalists
sued themselves they could be found liable under this statute for misappropriation of
trade secrets which encompasses disclosure under circumstances whether the reporter
knew or should have known it was from one under a duty to keep it confidential. See id.
at § 3426.1 (b)(1) (defining “Misappropriation”). “Trade secret” is defined under Cal.
Civ. Code § 3426.1 (d)(1) to mean:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use; and
91
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and in its Penal Code,95 with the “free speech” claim “rife with
complexities and restrictions” in light of the broad reach of
possible discovery under the California procedural law.96 It
concluded that Apple had met the necessary showing under the
five-part balancing test outlined by the California Supreme Court
in Mitchell v. Superior Court97 for weighing disclosure against the
First Amendment privilege.98 The Apple court set out the test and
its findings as follows:
(1) “Nature of the litigation and whether the reporter is a
party:”
Although not yet named as defendants, it is certainly
possible “journalists” may be; certainly Mr. O’Grady’s
declaration suggests this possibility.

(2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Id. at § 3426.1 (d)(1).
95
Cal. Penal Code § 499c (West 1999). The relevant provisions of this section of the
Code are as well fairly broad and may be found, should the authors themselves be sued,
to encompass their disclosure. But, it is not as encompassing as the civil liability basis
and will depend if the acceptance of the documents constituted unlawfully obtaining
access or whether there was some inducement to the source to deliver the information.
The relevant sections provide that theft of “trade secret” comprises:
(a)(3) Having unlawfully obtained access to the article, without authority
makes or causes to be made a copy of any article representing a trade
secret. . . .
(c) Every person who promises, offers or gives, or conspires to promise or offer
to give, to any present or former agent, employee or servant of another, a
benefit as an inducement, bribe or reward for conveying, delivering or
otherwise making available an article representing a trade secret owned by his
or her present or former principal, employer or master, to any person not
authorized by the owner to receive or acquire the trade secret and every present
or former agent, employee, or servant, who solicits, accepts, receives or takes a
benefit as an inducement, bribe or reward for conveying, delivering or
otherwise making available an article representing a trade secret owned by his
or her present or former principal, employer or master, to any person not
authorized by the owner to receive or acquire the trade secret, shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year,
or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($ 5,000), or by both that fine
and imprisonment.
Id. at § 499c(a)(3), (c).
96
Apple, 2005 WL 578641 at *2.
97
690 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1984).
98
Id. at 629–30.
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(2) “Does discovery sought go to the heart of plaintiff’s
claim:”
Without this discovery Apple’s case will be crippled, since
it will not know the defendants upon whom it should serve
process.
(3) “Have other sources of information been exhausted?”
The moving parties maintain Apple should have done more
investigating up to this point, including the unusual step of
noticing the depositions of its own employees. But the
Court is convinced, upon reviewing Apple’s public and in
camera materials that a thorough investigation has been
done and all alternative means have been exhausted.
(4) “What is the public good served by protecting the
misappropriation of trade secrets?”
Movants did not present a persuasive reason of “public
good” and never answered the Court’s inquiry as to why
there was a true public benefit from disclosure.99
Apple also met the fifth prong of the test which required a
prima facie showing on the merits of misappropriation of trade
secrets.
The court then held that the California shield laws did not
prevent the subpoena from issuing because the law did not grant a
privilege to a reporter, if indeed Mr. Jason O’Grady, the owner of
PowerPage, was a reporter. Rather, the shield laws granted
immunity from being held in contempt.100 However, the court held
that shield laws were not a “license conferred on anyone to violate
valid criminal laws.”101 Finally, the Apple court seemed to suggest

99
2005 WL 5786421 at *5–6 (citations omitted). In a later discussion, the Court states
that although much had been made of the public interest in Apple as a justification for the
assertion of privilege, there is a clear distinction between the interests of the public in an
‘iconic’ company such as Apple and disclosures in the public interest such as “the
whistleblower who discloses a health, safety, or welfare hazard affecting all, or the
government employee who reveals mismanagement or worse by our public officials.” Id.
at *8. Here, the Court reasoned, “the movants are doing nothing more than feeding the
public’s insatiable desire for information.” Id.
100
Id. at *6.
101
Id. at *6–7.
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that Mr. O’Grady himself was likely criminally liable for the
unlawful acquisition and dissemination of the proprietary
information.102
The websites appealed the lower court’s decision, which
essentially negates the application of journalist privilege where
trade secret is alleged, to the California Appellate Court.
Traditional media have filed briefs as amici curiae and refer to
these authors only as journalists.103 Apple has raised on appeal the
ability of bloggers to assert the privilege.104 This issue is one that
may ultimately need to be decided if the Appellate Court conducts
a de novo review based on all the facts and reverses on any basis.
There seems to be some grounds for reversal. The lower court
spent considerable time asserting the primacy of First Amendment
protection against prior restraint,105 which was not at issue in the
case. However, the lower court did not address the issue of the
First Amendment interest regarding the qualified privilege of
journalists to refuse to disclose confidential sources and
unpublished information, which is essential to gathering news to
inform the public. The Mitchell court did address this issue, which
is inherent in its balancing test.106 However, it is not clear that the
Apple court properly applied the Mitchell test. The owner of the
PowerPage website is a non-party. The court’s assertion that Mr.
O’Grady’s status as a non-party could change107 does not alter his
current status. The balance of First Amendment and disclosure
interests is different for non-parties.108 However, even as a party
to the litigation, the privilege is not necessarily negated.109 The
102

Id. at *7.
See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 55.
104
Dennis Sellers, Mac Sites Appeal Judge’s Pro-Apple Ruling in Lawsuit, MACSIMUM
NEWS: YOUR LEADING APPLE NEWS ALTERNATIVE (Mar. 23, 2005),
http://www.macsimumnews.com/index.php/archive/mac_sites_appeal_judges_pro_apple
_ruling_in_lawsuit.
105
Apple, 2005 WL 578641, at *4–5.
106
Id. at *5–6.
107
Id.
108
See Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
109
See id. This case involving a leak of sealed government information alleged to
comprise an invasion of privacy and on which the Mitchell court relied for the tests to be
applied in determining balance between disclosure and privilege. The Zerilli court held
that ‘in all but the most exceptional cases’ disclosure should yield to privilege in civil
103
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conclusion that disclosure was necessary because the information
was unavailable through other sources is fairly peremptory and
does not reflect the nature of the efforts that Apple did make.110 In
determining whether other sources of the information are available,
the courts, including the courts that authored the earlier federal
decisions on which the Mitchell test is based, apply a fairly
stringent test.111 The Mitchell decision makes clear that “all
alternative sources” should be exhausted, including the deposing of
numerous persons.112 In the Apple case, this would include, at
least, the Apple employees who had access to the confidential
information. Whether such an investigation was conducted is
unknown because the lower court based its decision in part on an
in camera inspection of Apple materials.113 However, it appears
unlikely that such an investigation was conducted. Where
constitutional protections are at stake, however, the factors for
consideration in the balancing of the interests should be made
clear.
The Apple decision does not address the intersection of the
journalist privilege and journalist use of contemporary
communications instrumentalities, such as an ISP, as a mediarelated source. If the privilege attaches to one’s unpublished
emails, should the courts permit the privilege to be bypassed
through issuance of a subpoena for the contents and
communications data from the non-privileged entity that holds the
actions involving non-party journalists. Id. at 712. Even in libel cases where the
journalist was the party, “disclosure should by no means be automatic.” Id. at 714. In
Zerilli, the refusal to order the disclosure by the reporter of its source of illegally obtained
and possibly illegally leaked information from an electronic surveillance, resulted in a
summary judgment against the plaintiff. Id. at 715.
110
Although the Apple court was not specific about Apple’s efforts, it was “convinced,
upon reviewing Apple’s public and in camera materials that a thorough investigation has
been done and all alternative means have been exhausted.” Apple, 2005 WL 578641, at
*6.
111
See Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 713–14; Baker v. F & F Investments, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d.
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
112
See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 634 (Cal. 1984). The Mitchell court
did not directly state that numerous depositions were required to be taken, but did so by
reference to Zerilli which stated that “an alternative requiring the taking of as many as 60
depositions might be a reasonable prerequisite to compelled disclosure.” Zerilli, 656 F.2d
at 714.
113
See Apple, 2005 WL 578641 at *6.
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data? This would undermine the policy underlying the First
Amendment privilege and the shield law immunities. Their
protections would be eroded and limited to face-to-face or written
communications.
Therefore, all electronic communications
leaving a digital trace that the communications provider holds
would be excluded from protection. In addition, the Apple court
seemingly concluded at the outset that there were no exceptions to
the trade secret laws, even under the First Amendment.114 As
California has concluded that the First Amendment requires
recognition of such privilege, unless and until the U.S. Supreme
Court says otherwise, a California state law cannot abrogate United
States constitutional protections.115
Therefore, unless the
balancing exercise the court performed is found to be properly
applied, the decision cannot stand.
If a court were ultimately required to decide whether these
websites with blog attributes116 (hence, for these purposes,
“blogs”) are entitled to protection under the California shield
provisions, the court would have to look to various sources for
guidance. The wording and headings of the California shield laws
are instructive. Section 1070 (a) identifies a group of protected
persons in “written” media based on their employment positions:
“a publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or
employed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical
publication, or by a press association or wire service, or any person
who has been so connected or employed.”117 In contrast,
subsection (b) of section 1070 protects identified persons involved
in broadcasting based on the nature of the industry in which they
are employed.118 Subsection (b) applies to “a radio or television
news reporter or other person connected with or employed by a
radio or television station, or any person who has been so
connected or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to
114

Id. at *4.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. In that event, California can still accord the greater
protection under its own constitution’s version of the First Amendment.
116
See Wikipedia, ‘Weblog,’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weblog (last visited Apr. 29,
2005); Apple Suits: Myth-Busting, EWEEK.COM, http://blog.ziffdavis.com/rothenberg/
archive/2005/03/17/6456.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2005).
117
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (West 1995).
118
See id. § 1070(b).
115

FLANAGAN

3/17/2006 10:57 AM

2006] BLOGGING AND THE JOURNALIST PRIVILEGE

415

disclose the source of any information procured while so connected
or employed for news or news commentary purposes on radio or
television.”119 This clearly excludes those in broadcasting whose
function is providing mere entertainment rather than news or news
commentary.
The “news” limitation is reinforced by the headings of the
statutory sections. The protection is contained in the California
Evidence Code section 1070, entitled “Refusal to disclose news
source,” which is in Chapter 5, entitled “Immunity of Newsman
from Citation for Contempt,” of Division 8, entitled “Privileges” of
the Evidence Code.
This structure suggests a functional
requirement that the protected person be engaged in news or news
commentary under some evaluative standard that is possibly
presumed to already govern newspapers, magazines, and periodical
publications under subsection (a).
III. JOURNALISTIC CODE OF ETHICS AS FUNCTIONAL TEST FOR
JOURNALIST
Although alternative tests have been proposed for
distinguishing journalist bloggers from all other bloggers, Linda L.
Berger, a legal scholar and former newsperson, has suggested an
evaluative tool that seems worthy of consideration in her article
“Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to
Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of
Publication.”120 Noting that defining “news”‘ or “newsperson” is
as unhelpful as defining “journalist,” she suggests that there is an
objective process to legitimate journalism that seeks to gather,
evaluate and disseminate truthful information to the public on a
regular basis.121 Under a cost-benefit analysis, the use of such
criteria as the threshold for protection is appropriate because it
enhances “the free flow of information to the public while only
slightly diminishing the accuracy and efficiency of judicial or
governmental processes by allowing witnesses to withhold

119
120
121

Id. (emphasis added).
39 HOUSTON L. REV. 1371 (2002-2003).
Id. at 1411–16.
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information.”122 In this way, neither job titles nor industry
affiliations123 that are based on and limited to the status quo in a
converging world of media platforms would control; nor would
labels such as “blog”. Such functional criteria would not impose
any prior restraints on the nature of the content that might impinge
upon First Amendment concerns or require vague and theoretical
distinctions to categorize the content as news, entertainment or a
matter of public interest.124
The test of public interest is one that is only determined in
hindsight and, therefore, is not really helpful to the individuals or
entities seeking to disseminate information within the protections
that hinge on such a determination. However, such a test, in many
instances, seems unavoidable. This is especially true where the
nature of the information can give rise to a claim against the
publication, such as defamation, invasion of privacy, or, as in
Apple, a trade secrets action. Under each of these types of claims,
the court has to evaluate the content. If, however, the process by
which it was gathered, evaluated, validated and disseminated
conforms to a professional standard of journalism, it is likely to
ultimately work against a finding on the merits. For example, a
valid defense in a defamation action is a showing that the allegedly
defamatory statement is true. Adherence to a journalist’s code of
professionalism that required validation of information would tend
to ensure truth. Further, knowledge on the part of the journalist that
adherence to such code could trigger whatever journalistic
protections were available would not only serve to provide
advance guidance but also to encourage such adherence.
Moreover, examining the public interest protected in that
publication or newsgathering and balancing it against the
competing interest of disclosure of the source of that news seems
necessary to determine which is more worthy of protection in that
case. This is especially when other important societal interests are
at stake, such as another civil or human right. So, rather than hold
that a qualified privilege attains merely because a person can show
122

Id. at 1374.
She notes that a proposal for a model shield law would require specific connections
to “established media.” Id. at 1408–09.
124
Id. at 1409–12.
123
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status as a journalist because (1) either (a) adhere to a code of
ethics or (b) they gather news routinely and (2) because any
information they publish is subject to an editorial process and
philosophy, and thus the content is not unsubstantiated “gossip,
nonsense or disinformation” unprotected by shield laws,125 the
better course would include the process evaluation to determine ab
initio whether a person is a journalist entitled to claim privilege. A
further weighting, and possibly even a presumption, of the
importance of the free speech interest could be attained by the
defendant once the defendant had proven the professionalism of
the process. Only an interest of countervailing weight could
overcome this presumption, which would be determined by an
examination of the circumstances of the case. The data protection
laws of the United Kingdom provide one example of such
balancing.126 These exempt journalists from many of the duties
otherwise imposed on the controllers of personal data in the
interest of freedom of expression. Of course, in circumstances
where the privilege is absolute and based on status as journalist,
evidence of customary adherence to a professional code of
journalistic ethics would be compelling proof of having performed
the function of a ‘real’ journalist. It would be largely irrelevant
whether this was a member of a professional journalist society, an
employee subject to an employment code by a media organization
that has identified its own ethical criteria or as an individual
blogger who has chosen to identify and follow such standards.
IV. THE JOURNALIST

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

How a code of practice can serve as the threshold for test of
entitlement to claim privileges intended to protect freedom of
expression and, thus, whether a blogger is so entitled, is a question
that can be answered under certain United Kingdom and English
law related to journalistic activities. These include the Data

125
126

See id. at 1410.
See infra Part IV A.
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Protection Act 1998127 (‘DPA’) and the qualified privilege in
defense of defamation.128
A. Data Protection Act 1998
The DPA and the secondary legislation promulgated
thereunder provide advance guidance which uses objective,
professional ethics criteria as to who benefits under its journalist
exceptions. Implementing the European Union Data Protection
Directive,129 the DPA comprises a scheme of obligations for the
lawful processing of personal data by those who collect personal
data and outlines the rights of the personal data subjects. The
protections under the Directive and, therefore, the DPA are
premised on Article 8 of the Council of Europe Convention for
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CoE
Human Rights Convention).130 This protects privacy,131 except as
lawfully necessary to protect other societal interests such as the
rights and freedom of others. The Directive is also premised on
the European Union’s (EU) internal market powers, which here
ensure the cross-border flow of such data that is integral to the
growth of a single market.132 Other interests are also balanced
127

Data Protection Act, 1998, ch.29 (Eng.).
See infra Part IV. B.
129
European Parliament and Council Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281)31, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/
sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31995L0046
[hereinafter Directive].
130
Council of Europe Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, European Treaty Series No. 005, available at
http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/echrtext.htm [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights]..
131
Id. at art. 8. Article 8 provides:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home
and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.
Id.
132
Directive, supra note 129, at art. 1(2).
128
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within the EU Directive and the DPA, such as the protection of the
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the CoE Human Rights
Convention.133 Exceptions are granted for journalists, artists and
others from some of the obligations applied to other data
controllers so that they can gather information involving personal
data.134 The DPA defines “journalism” as one of three “special
purposes” for which personal data may be processed. The other
two special purposes are literary purpose and artistic purpose.135
Section 32 of the DPA, exempts any person processing data for a
special purpose from nearly all of the data protection principles
that govern the processing of personal data, including sensitive
personal data,136 if:
(a) the processing is undertaken with a view to the
publication by any person of any journalistic, literary or
artistic material,
(b) the data controller reasonably believes that, having
regard in particular to the special importance of the public
interest in freedom of expression, publication would be in
the public interest, and
(c) the data controller reasonably believes that, in all the
circumstances, compliance with that provision is
incompatible with the special purposes.137
The DPA, however, further provides that in determining the
reasonableness of the belief that publication138 is in the public
interest under subsection (b), one can consider compliance with
133

European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 130, art. 10.
Directive, supra note 129, at art. 9 (stating that “[m]ember States shall provide for
exemptions or derogations from the provisions of this Chapter, Chapter IV and Chapter
VI for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the
purpose of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right
to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression.”).
135
See Data Protection Act, 1998, ch.29, § 3 (Eng.).
136
See Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Data) Order, 2000, No. 417, sch., ¶
3(1)(c) (Eng.).
137
Data Protection Act, 1998, § 32(1)(a)-(c) (Eng.).
138
“Publish” in connection with “special purposes” processing under the Data
Protection Act is defined merely as to “make available to the public or any section of the
public.” Id. at § 32(6).
134
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any relevant code of practice applicable for that publication and
which the Secretary of State has designated for such purposes.139
The Data Protection (Designated Codes of Practice) Order140 has
identified five separate codes of practice which may be used: (1)
the Broadcast Standards Commission’s code, (2) the Independent
Television Commission code, (3) the Press Complaint
Commission’s Code of Practice, (4) the BBC Producers’
Guidelines, and (5) the Radio Authority’s code.141
Examining these, the one most likely relevant to bloggers is the
Press Complaint Commission’s Code of Practice.142 This code is a
voluntary code developed by the newspaper and periodical
industry, approved by the Press Complaint Commission (PCC) and
applies to both “printed and online versions of publications.”143
Although clearly developed by and with press institutions in mind,
it does not by its terms or application limit itself to any specific
press organization or type of publication.144 The PCC’s standards
govern the newsgathering, verification and dissemination of
information. They appear to have been amended over time to
reflect the current human rights legislation and decisions.145 For
example, a recent change to the PCC prevents all photography of
people in private places without their consent. A private place is
defined as a place that includes both private property and public
property where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.146 A
place may be private irrespective of whether a long lens was
139

Id. at § 32(3).
Data Protection (Designated Codes of Practice) Order, 2000, No. 1864 (Eng.).
141
Id. The Broadcasting Standards Commission, Independent Television Commission
and the Radio Authority have been subsumed within the Office of Communications
(Ofcom), the UK regulator for communications industries that includes television and
radio
communications
services.
See
The
Radio
Authority,
http://www.radioauthority.org.uk (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).
142
CODE OF PRACTICE (Press Complaints Commission 2005), available at
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/cop.asp.
143
Id.
144
See id.
145
Press
Complaints
Commission,
Code
of
Practice:
Introduction,
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/intro.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2006); Press Complaints
Commission,
Code
of
Practice:
History
of
the
Code,
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/history.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
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used.147 This provision appears to take into account the decision of
the European Court of Human Rights in Von Hannover v.
Germany.148
This provision may require a more precise
interpretation by the PCC to effect the scope of the private life
standard in that decision.
Thus, under the DPA’s use of the PCC codes as an objective
standard for reasonableness,149 the professional journalistic process
analysis is built into the public interest balance of privacy and
freedom of expression. This does not seem to be precluded by the
Human Rights Act 1998150 which incorporates much of the
Council of Europe Convention for Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms151 into United Kingdom law and requires
government officials, including judges, to act in a manner not
inconsistent with the Convention when they interpret and apply
laws.152 This, therefore, requires that the freedom of expression,
protected under Article 10 of the Convention, be considered as a
separate public interest in interpreting the DPA, which implements

147

See Press Complaints Commission, Code of Practice: History of the Code,
http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/history.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2006) (stating that
amendments made in June 2004 to the privacy provision were intended to cover all
photography of people in private places regardless of whether a long-lens had been used).
148
40 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2005).
149
The PCC Code is not as comprehensive or as strongly worded in some areas, such as
independence and fair play, as the provisions of other codes. Compare CODE OF PRACTICE
(Press Complaints Commission 2005), available at http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/cop.asp
(lacking any specific provisions requiring indepdence or fair play) with STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES, arts. III, VI (American Society of Newspaper Editors 2002), available at
http://www.asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm (specifically requiring indepdence and
fair play). However, the PCC Code is more comprehensive and strongly worded in
certain areas, such as privacy, than other codes. Compare CODE OF PRACTICE § 3 (Press
Complaints Commission 2005), available at http://www.pcc.org.uk/cop/cop.asp
(specifically protecting privacy) with CODE OF ETHICS (Society of Professional Journalists
1996), available at http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp (lacking a provision specifically
protecting privacy). For a further discussion of the weaknesses in the PCC Code of
Practice as an objective standard for balancing conflicting public interests such as privacy
and freedom of expression, see Part II.A.2.c of this article entitled “Defamation and
Qualified Privilege.” For links to various news associations and ethical codes, see
http://www.asne.org/print.cfm?printer_page=%2Findex%2Ecfm%2Findex%2Ecfm%3Fi
d%3D387.
150
Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.).
151
See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 130.
152
Id. at art. 1.
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protections stemming from Article 8 of the Convention.153 The
permitted restrictions on Article 10’s freedom of expression can be
imposed only pursuant to law and where necessary in a democratic
society.154 Such restrictions include those arising from the
responsibilities and duties that arise when the freedom of speech is
exercised and for the protection of the reputation and the rights of
others.155 Compliance with a voluntary code of practice that
restricts the manner in which the press may gather news, including
those restrictions imposed to protect privacy interests, for
eligibility for an exemption from the right to privacy under the
DPA seems to be a proportionate restriction on the freedom of
expression. This results seems justified when balanced against the
potential for harm that might occur from the interference with
privacy under the exemption which is necessary to ensure access to
information and its dissemination, as would seem to be required by
the holding in Campbell v. MGN, Ltd.,156 where the House of
Lords elaborated the necessary balancing approach required under
the Human Rights Act 1998.
B. Defamation and Qualified Privilege
How a journalistic process test can be applied in the context of
qualified privilege and using a code of practice can further be seen
in examining the English law governing defamation. A privilege is
recognized as a defense to an allegation of defamation under
English common law and statute. This privilege applies to
comments made without malice which were reasonably believed to
be true concerning matters which the person publishing the
statements was under a duty to make or had a legitimate interest in
so doing and the person(s) to whom the statements were made had
either a duty or a legitimate interest in receiving the statements.157
Although the privilege applies to everyone, it has been interpreted
153

Id. at arts. 8, 10.
Id. at art. 10(2).
155
Id.
156
[2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.) (balancing articles 8 and 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 140).
157
See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, [2001] 2 A.C. 127, 164-65 (H.L.) (appeal taken
from C.A.) (quoting Silkin v. Beaverbrook Newspapers, Ltd. [1958] 1 W.L.R. 743, 74647).
154

FLANAGAN

3/17/2006 10:57 AM

2006] BLOGGING AND THE JOURNALIST PRIVILEGE

423

most often in the journalistic context. There is no privilege that
attaches purely because the communication relates to information
regarding political matters, including elections, because personal
reputations would fail to be protected. Receiving information
about political matters is clearly in the public interest and is
important under the freedom of expression. Despite this, the
limitations on the qualified privilege that are necessary to protect
reputation are considered to meet the requirements of necessity for
encroachments on the exercise of this freedom.158
In 2001, the House of Lords in Reynolds v. Times
Newspapers,159 reached this conclusion. It noted that, under the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, journalists have the
right “to divulge information on issues of general interest provided
they are acting in good faith and on ‘an accurate factual basis’ and
supply reliable and precise information in accordance with the
ethics of journalism” but that “a journalist is not required to
guarantee the accuracy of his facts.”160 The test for whether the
qualified privilege attached to the publishing of such information
without malice fell under the traditional test balancing the interests
and duties at stake.161 The elasticity of this test enables
accommodation of freedom of expression interests. The House of
Lords set a list of ten non-exclusive factors to be considered in
deciding whether a communication satisfied the test and qualified
for the privilege.162 These factors also serve as guidance for
reporters and publishers. The factors include:

158
159
160
161
162

See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 130, at art. 10(2).
[2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (appeal taken from C.A.).
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id. at 205.
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1. The seriousness of the allegation.
2. The nature of the information, and the extent to which
the subject matter is a matter of public concern.
3. The source of the information.
4. The steps taken to verify the information.
5. The status of the information, for example, the matter
may already be under an investigation which
commands respect.
6. The urgency of the matter, as news is often a perishable
commodity.
7. Whether comment was sought from the claimant,
although this is not always necessary.
8. Whether the article contained the gist of the plaintiff’s
side of the story.
9. The tone of the article, e.g. whether the allegations are
stated as fact.
10. The circumstances of the publication, including the
timing.163
In applying the factors, each of which are given different
weights in accordance with the circumstances of each case, the
House of Lords noted that a court’s decision is made in hindsight
which is a benefit the reporter does not have. Thus, the handicap
of the reporter should be taken into account. Further, the decision
not to disclose a confidential source should not weigh against the

163

See id.
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finding of privilege. Any “lingering doubts” are to be resolved in
favor of publication.164
Thus, the Reynolds court has essentially incorporated the
journalist process test to balance the duties and the public interest
at stake. Clearly, some of these factors would be addressed by
adherence to the PCC, such as the standards for accurate
information, the requirement to distinguish between fact and
comment or conjecture and, possibly the need for a fair
opportunity to reply to inaccuracies. Others would be met by a
code with more rigor. For example, the Society of Professional
Journalists’ Code of Ethics requires that journalists (1) diligently
seek comment from the subject regarding allegations of misdoing,
(2) question the motive of sources seeking anonymity, (3) test the
accuracy of information from all sources and (4) avoid
advocacy.165 Were the PCC, or an individual publication including
a blogger, to enhance its operating standards to include some of
these other standards imposed by the Society of Professional
Journalists’ Code of Ethics, compliance with such enhanced code
would be likely to ensure that journalistic privilege would attach
because the publication would likely satisfy the balancing test of
the duties and the public interest. Under the Reynolds test, the
court must evaluate the content of the communication for its
subject matter with more weight accorded to political or other
purely public matters under the freedom of expression balance.
CONCLUSION
The journalistic process test is a valuable and workable test to
determine when one is functioning as a journalist no matter what
label is applied to the person’s employment or publication
medium. It can be implemented practically by requiring a showing
of customary adherence to a code of journalist professionalism.
This would establish that a person followed acceptable and
recognized journalistic processes for gathering, evaluating,

164

Id.
CODE OF ETHICS (Society of Professional Journalists 1996), available at
http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp (last visited Aug. 26, 2005).
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validating and publishing information. Professional codes could,
therefore, be used as the journalist process test for granting special
protections and privileges accorded in the interest of freedom of
expression such as those recognized under the U.S. First
Amendment and statutory shield laws and common law
protections.
This is a workable scheme that appears to
accommodate varying scopes of protection or privilege,166
although statutory language might need to be amended to
accommodate it. With an absolute privilege, for example, it could
serve of itself to verify valid journalist status. Here, as well, a
person might be considered to have ‘earned’ the privilege
addressing some views of links to press responsibility. For
qualified privileges, the test could be used as a first step together
with those other criteria, in statutes or developed by courts, to
balance the competing interests. Compliance with objective
professional standards evinces considerable intent and procedural
steps to ensure that the facts communicated were of greater validity
than disinformation and mere rumor and could further assist in the
balance. The United Kingdom experience demonstrates this. It
has, without enunciating such a test, effectively put a journalist
process test into practice in certain statutes and decisions. The
DPA scheme uses a publishers’ code of professional practice to
balance whether according the privilege to limit privacy rights is
reasonable. Because neither the DPA nor the qualified defamation
privilege are limited to a particular entity, industry or status but
rather apply to any ‘person’, the de jure process analysis of the
United Kingdom’s DPA and the de facto process analysis of the
English common law privilege in Reynolds permit such freedom of
expression protections to encompass many types of media outlets,
as appropriate. These can include the evolving and more
participatory media, such as “blogs,” that the Internet and other
convergences have and are likely to produce. Such approach in the
United Kingdom appears to provide the flexibility to balance the

166

For example, customary adherence to a code of academic integrity could likely serve
to identify the non-journalist scholar whose writing these days might be published in
blog, an online journal or a traditional publication. See, e.g., George Washington
University, Code of Academic Integrity, available at: http://www.gwu.edu/
~ntegrity/code.html#repeal.
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competing interests under Council of Europe Convention for
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that the
United Kingdom is required to address. This approach would also
accord the flexibility and the ability to incorporate different
national or other professional standards that reflect the differing
rights and sensibilities of each country as well as the possibility
that individual bloggers or organizations could follow higher
ethical standards. This suggests that it is a test that the United
States could readily adapt to its own public interest balance
whether under the First Amendment, common law and specific
statutes affecting public communications.
Congress should
seriously consider this approach in any future debate for a federal
shield law.

